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Abstract:  There is a wide range of realist but non-Platonist philosophies of mathematics – 
naturalist or Aristotelian realisms. Held by Aristotle and Mill, they played little part in 
twentieth century philosophy of mathematics but have been revived recently. They assimilate 
mathematics to the rest of science. They hold that mathematics is the science of X, where X is 
some observable feature of the (physical or other non-abstract) world. Choices for X include 
quantity, structure, pattern, complexity, relations. The article lays out and compares these 
options, including their accounts of what X is, the examples supporting each theory, and the 
reasons for identifying the science of X with (most or all of) mathematics. Some comparison 
of the options is undertaken, but the main aim is to display the spectrum of viable alternatives 
to Platonism and nominalism. It is explained how these views answer Frege’s widely accepted 
argument that arithmetic cannot be about real features of the physical world, and arguments 
that such mathematical objects as large infinities and perfect geometrical figures cannot be 
physically realized. 
 






What is the nature of mathematical entities like numbers, sets and functions? According to 
Platonism (the “standard” or “full-blooded” or “objects” Platonism usual in the philosophy of 
mathematics), they are classical “abstract objects”: acausal, atemporal objects existing 
necessarily in a Platonic realm, neither physical nor mental. (Linnebo 2009/2018; Brown 2008, 
ch. 2) According to nominalism, they do not exist at all; there are only physical objects, and 
the mathematical language that appears to refer to mathematical objects is just a language of 
science, or manipulation of formal symbols, or fictions, or method of deducing one contentful 
proposition from others. By Ockham’s Razor, there is no need to postulate abstract entities 
once those tasks are accomplished. 
Aristotelian realist philosophy of mathematics points out that Platonism and nominalism do 
not exhaust the possibilities. Numbers (etc) could exist but in a way other than as Platonic 
entities – for example as properties of physical objects, such as their structural or relational or 
quantitative properties. Any such view, any “immanent mathematical realism (any realism 
acceptable to a physicalist)” (Irvine1990), falls within the tradition of Aristotelian realism, in 
the wide sense of a non-Platonist realism according to which a presumptive reality exists “in 
the things themselves”. Aristotelianism’s commitment only to naturalistically acceptable 
scientific entities makes it possible to claim that it is “the current philosophy of mathematics 
that fits best with what is known about minds and science.” (Thagard 2019, 274) A search for 
such an alternative will become attractive if it is felt that Platonism and nominalism have 
reached an impasse, and if considerations within mathematics, especially applied mathematics, 
bring to the fore mathematical properties of the (non-abstract) world such as symmetry, ratio 
and continuity. 
 
1. The mathematical aspects of reality 
 
While the Platonist-nominalist debate is strictly an internal debate in philosophy, 
Aristotelian realists also urge that the physical world can be easily seen to have mathematical 
properties, which must be the subject of some science. If we just look at how mathematics 
works (especially applied mathematics), free of philosophical preconceptions, it should be 
possible to see what properties of reality are mathematical (rather than physical, biological and 
so on) and form the true subject-matter of mathematics. 
Imagine the Earth in the Jurassic Era, before there were humans to think mathematically and 
write formulas. There were dinosaurs large and small, trees, volcanoes, flowing rivers and 
winds … Were there, in that world, any properties that we would recognize as being of a 
mathematical nature (to speak as non-committally as possible)? That is, were there, among the 
properties of the real things in that physical world, some that we would naturally recognize as 
mathematical (over and above physical, chemical and biological properties)? 
There were many such properties. Symmetry, for one. Like most higher animals, the 
dinosaurs had approximate bilateral symmetry. The trees and volcanoes had an approximate 
circular symmetry with random elements – seen from above, they look much the same when 
rotated around their axis. But symmetry, whether exact or approximate, is a property that is not 
exactly physical. Non-physical things can have symmetry; arguments and palindromes, for 
example, have symmetry if the last half repeats the first half in the opposite order. Symmetry 
is an uncontroversially mathematical property, and a major branch of pure mathematics – group 
theory – is devoted to classifying its kinds. When symmetry is realized in physical things, it is 
often very obvious to perception – even animals as primitive as bees can perceive symmetry. 
(Giurfa et al. 1996) Symmetry, like other mathematical properties, can have causal powers, 
unlike abstracta as conceived by Platonists. 
Another mathematical property, which like symmetry is realizable in many sorts of physical 
things, is ratio. The height of a big dinosaur stands in a certain ratio to the height of a small 
dinosaur. The ratio of their volumes is different – in fact, the ratio of their volumes is much 
greater than the ratio of their heights, which is what makes big dinosaurs ungainly and small 
ones sprightly. A given ratio is something that can be the relation between two heights, or two 
volumes, or two time intervals; a ratio is just what those relations between different kinds of 
physical entities share, and is thus a more mathematical property than the physical lengths, 
volumes, and times themselves. Ratio is what we measure when we determine how a length 
(or volume, or time, etc) relates to an arbitrarily chosen unit. It is one of the basic kinds of 
number. 
Properties of reality like symmetry and ratio and others (such as flows, order relations, 
continuity and discreteness, alternation, linearity, feedback, network topology) – which are 
measurable, perceivable and causal, like other scientific properties – must be the subject of 
some science. That science is mathematics (or at least part of mathematics). 
With that intuitive approach to Aristotelian realism laid out, let us return to how it relates to 
the main alternatives in the philosophy of mathematics. 
2. The Platonist-nominalist impasse 
 
It is not possible to consider all the reasons for and against Platonism and nominalism, but 
a brief survey of the standard objections raised by each against the other will help explain the 
opportunities for the Aristotelian alternative. 
Platonists argue, against nominalism, that mathematics is indispensable to science and 
reference in science to mathematical entities is ineliminable. (Colyvan 2001; Linnebo 
2009/2018, section 2) Aristotelians accept that argument, but point out that it does not imply 
anything about the nature of mathematical entities, in particular that it does not imply they must 
be classical abstract objects. (Newstead and Franklin 2012) Indeed, Colyvan, the leading 
proponent of the indispensability argument, includes Aristotelian realisms among the positions 
to which the argument applies. (Colyvan 2001, 4; Pincock 2012, ch. 9) If therefore Aristotelian 
realism proves more acceptable than Platonist on general metaphysical grounds, it can claim 
all the support that Platonism receives from the indispensability argument. 
Nominalists argue, against Platonism, that Platonists fail to explain how there can be 
epistemic access to abstract objects. If they are acausal, how can they affect us so that we can 
come to know them? (Liggins 2010) If on the other hand we posit them to play some theoretical 
role, that is quite unlike positing atoms, which play the role of causing the observations which 
they are intended to explain; without a causal role, it is hard to see what role Platonist entities 
play beyond a purely linguistic one. (Cheyne and Pigden 1996) Aristotelians offer to show that 
at least some of the objects of mathematics, properties such as symmetry and quantity, are 
straightforwardly causal and perceivable. 
Nominalists argue too that abstract objects are ruled out by naturalism and are not needed 
in any other area of science, so mathematics would be anomalous in requiring their existence. 
(Papineau, 2007/2015  section 1.8) Aristotelians agree with that argument too, and offer to 
exhibit mathematics as having a naturalistically acceptable subject matter. 
Nominalists and Platonists both also argue that their opponents give no satisfactory account 
of applied mathematics – of the “unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics” and its role in 
explaining physical phenomena. (Steiner 1998; Pincock 2012, ch. 8) Platonists, say 
nominalists, fail to explain how truths about abstract objects can inform us about those aspects 
of the real world typically studied by applied mathematics, like continuous flows and 
symmetries. Nominalists, say Platonists, have the same problem: why should manipulating 
formal symbols or fictions inform us about those same real entities and allow us to establish 
contentful and useful truths about them? Aristotelians offer to supply a view of mathematics 
as inherently applied – as much inherently applied as physics or biology – since it is about 
properties possessed in any case by physical things (and whatever other things there may be). 
In addition, Aristotelians believe that Platonists and nominalists make a common error: of 
regarding everything that exists as a particular (whether abstract or concrete). Aristotelians 
argue that science typically deals in universals – for example the relations between mass, 
distance and force described in Newton’s law of gravity – and that mathematics should follow 
suit by, for example, studying properties like symmetry and continuity and what progressions 
have in common. Universals are not “things” (particulars) that come into and go out of 
existence (though particulars can come to and cease to have universals). Thus the truths about 
them, such as the transitivity of greater-than (if A is greater than B and B is greater than C, 
then A is greater than C) can be eternal and necessary. Aristotelianism is thus not a simple 
empiricism, despite claiming that mathematics is directly about reality. 
 
3. The Aristotelian spectrum in the philosophy of mathematics 
 
Any Aristotelian realism about the objects of mathematics faces certain well-known 
problems (to be considered more fully in the last section). For example, some of the objects of 
mathematics appear to be too big to fit into physical reality, such as the huge and probably 
uninstantiated higher infinities. And as noted by Aristotle himself, mathematicians appear to 
speak of idealizations like perfect circles which likewise may not be literally instantiated. But 
then Platonism and nominalism face well-known objections too. The first thing is to lay out the 
options and their prima facie strengths. That has not so far been done – for example, the 
extensive classification of realist philosophies of mathematics in Balaguer’s Platonism and 
Anti-Platonism in Mathematics (1998, 11) instances only Mill under (non-mentalistic) 
“realistic anti-Platonism”. Only when it is done can there be a fair contest as to which 
philosophy of mathematics can best establish itself and reply to objections.  
The book of Franklin (2014a, summary in Franklin 2011) defended one particular version 
of Aristotelian realism in the philosophy of mathematics, the view that mathematics is the 
“science of quantity and structure” (those two being interpreted as real properties of non-
abstract reality). One reviewer rightly pointed out that “One of the beauties of the Aristotelian 
position introduced is that it has far more scope for internal variation than either Platonist or 
nominalist alternatives.” (Jones 2015) Indeed there have been a few other recent presentations 
of explicitly Aristotelian realist philosophies of mathematics (Jacquette 2014; Gillies 2015; 
Knapp 2014; Hossack 2020). The aim of the present article is to clarify the range of Aristotelian 
realist philosophies of mathematics and explain their virtues as an alternative to Platonism and 
nominalism. 
It is the basic question, “What is mathematics about?” that distinguishes among varieties of 
Aristotelianism, as well as distinguishing Aristotelianism from its competitors. Platonism and 
nominalism have simple answers to that question. Platonism holds that mathematics is about 
abstract entities. Nominalism holds that mathematics is not about anything at all (but is a 
language or the manipulation of formal symbols or a fiction or similar). Aristotelianism, on the 
other hand, aims to exhibit mathematics as the science of some aspect of the (non-abstract) 
world, opening the way to various choices about what that aspect is. 
So as to concentrate on essentials, two matters are left aside although they are necessary for 
a full appreciation of the Aristotelian realist alternative. The first is metaphysics strictly 
speaking. Platonism and nominalism have clear and well-developed metaphysical positions in 
general, to which Aristotelianism must present an equally clear and well-developed alternative. 
That has been done, in general metaphysics outside the philosophy of mathematics. (A classic 
attempt is Armstrong 1997; tutorial in Franklin 2014a, ch. 1; in the philosophy of mathematics 
context in Jacquette 2014) Those general theories, though necessary to underpin an Aristotelian 
position, are outside the scope of the present article, which concerns Aristotelian approaches 
to the philosophy of mathematics specifically. For present purposes we can adopt a minimal 
and commonsense realism about properties of physical reality: the way in which physics takes 
for granted the reality of its objects such as mass and charge is the way in which Aristotelian 
realism will take the reality of ratios, patterns, symmetries or whatever it claims to be the 
objects of mathematics. What is necessary in the first instance for Aristotelianism to become a 
live option in the philosophy of mathematics is an account of what aspects of (non-abstract) 
reality it could be about, that is, what properties are mathematical. 
 The second topic to be left aside is epistemology. Prima facie Aristotelianism has an 
advantage over Platonism, since (many) properties of physical objects can be perceived, 
whereas it is widely argued, as above, that Platonism has a severe “access” problem, as its 
abstract objects cannot have causal effect on human brains. (Franklin 2014a, part II; Jacquette 
2014, section 6; Lehrer Dive 2003) On the other hand, it may be harder to explain proof, which 
appears to distinguish mathematical from scientific epistemology. However, that too is beyond 
the scope of the present discussion of positions on the objects of mathematics. 
Furthermore, existing Aristotelian positions have not developed metaphysical or 
epistemological views at length (with the exception of Franklin 2014a, based on Armstrong) 
and so have not disagreed about them.  It is the question “What is mathematics about?” that 
separates different positions. 
We will treat several theories that have been put forward of the form “Mathematics is the 
science of X” (where X is something that could be realized in the non-abstract world: patterns, 
structure, relations, quantity …). For each theory, these questions need to be addressed: 
• What are the intuitive reasons and examples suggesting the theory? 
• Have its defenders given a precise definition or characterization of X? 
• What are the arguments for seeing (all or much) of mathematics as included in X? 
• What are the reasons for thinking that the science of X is included in mathematics? 
• What is each theory’s account of natural numbers? (Since all offer something on this 
basic question) 
We include brief discussion, where applicable, on the prospects of each theory and on such 
questions as the compatiblity of views and whether some are really relabellings of others. In 
general, the suggested subject-matters of mathematics all have some credibility, and an eirenic 
rather than combative attitude to different claims is indicated. We will briefly compare the 
theories after surveying them. 
Note however that the question “What real aspects of the world, if any, does mathematics 
study?” is not the same as the question “Do (some or all) of the nouns used in mathematical 
discourse refer to real objects?” The latter question was central to the indispensability argument 
for realism and is natural in considering whether complex numbers, for example, are fictions. 
But it has little relevance to the basic question of what mathematics studies. For comparison, 
the question “Does demography deal with quantitative variation in populations?” is little 
affected by whether “the average Londoner” is a real entity or a fiction that aids thinking about 
a population. We will consider in section 9 below fictionalist extensions of Aristotelian realism. 
True, it would be surprising if the most basic mathematical language, like “2” and “bigger 
than” failed to refer. It will be clear in the accounts to be given below what the authors think 
such language refers to. 
4. Mathematics as the “science of quantity” 
 
An Aristotelian realist philosophy of mathematics dominated from ancient times to the 
eighteenth century. It held that mathematics is the “science of quantity”. Quantity, one of 
Aristotle’s categories, was taken to be a real, observable property of the physical world as much 
as qualities were. (Biancani 1615, discussed in Park 2018, ch. 12; Barrow 1734, 10-15; 
Encyclopedia Britannica 1771, article ‘Mathematics’, vol. III 30-31; Jesseph 1993, ch. 1)  
Quantity was said to be divided into the discrete (studied by arithmetic) and the continuous 
(studied by geometry and later by the calculus). The origins of the theory are literally 
Aristotelian (Metaphysics bk 5 ch. 13, 1020a7-12). The quantity theory plainly gives an 
initially reasonable picture of at least elementary mathematics, with its emphasis on counting, 
measuring, and calculating with the resulting numbers. It promises direct answers to questions 
about what the object of mathematics is (certain properties of physical and possibly non-
physical things such as their size), and how those properties are known (the same way other 
natural properties of physical things are known – by perception in simple cases and inference 
from perception in more complex ones). It is as easy to perceive that the ratio of length to 
breadth of a rectangle is approximately double as it is to perceive that the rectangle is white. 
Not much was heard of the realist quantity theory after 1800. A simplified version of it was 
defended by John Stuart Mill, as discussed below, but the criticisms of Mill made by Frege 
were generally thought to have decisively ruled out any such realist theory. 
A strong point of the “science of quantity” theory is that it makes sense of measurement. 
Measurement is the most direct connection between mathematics and the world, as it directly 
assigns numbers to parts of the physical world (or more exactly their ratios), but has had a 
strangely low profile in the philosophy of mathematics. 
The theory of measurement displays particularly clearly the difference between a Platonist 
and an Aristotelian approach to quantity. The foundational approach to measurement (in  
classical measurement theory, outside the philosophy of mathematics) sets up the problem with 
a Platonist bias, concentrating on “representation theorems” that describe the conditions under 
which quantities can be represented by numbers. (e.g. Savage and Ehrlich 1992) That poses 
the problem as if it is one about the association of numbers to parts of the world, which 
inevitably leads to a Platonist perspective. 
But a closer look suggests an Aristotelian reinterpretation. What is it about the quantitative 
properties of the measured world that ensures that a representation by numbers exists? If, for 
example, we measure the length of an object by laying out unit rods beside it, the quantitative 
property of length exists prior to the representation and is the condition of its existence. As the 
Aristotelian maintains, the system of ratios of lengths, including the ratio of object to unit, 
exists in the physical things being measured, and measurement consists in identifying the ratios 
that are of interest in a particular case; the arbitrary choice of unit merely allows ratios to be 
converted to digital numerals for ease of calculation. (Bigelow and Pargetter 1990, 60-61) That 
in turn suggests an Aristotelian realist view of the real numbers arising in measurement: they 
are in the first instance spatio-temporally located relations of ratio. (Michell 2005; Michell 
1994; Mundy 1987; Knapp 2014, ch. 2; Hossack 2020, ch. 8; relation to Aristotle in Crowley 
1996) Irrational ratios can be instantiated as well as rational ones – for example, if physical 
space is real and perfectly Euclidean, as it could be, then π is instantiated as the ratio of perfectly 
circular parts of space to their diameters (though of course measurable only approximately). 
That still leaves the quantity theorist with the task of precisely defining “quantity”. Which 
properties exactly are quantitative (as opposed to say qualitative)?  
Starting from Aristotle’s concepts of what is “subject to more and less” and “divisible into 
parts”, a possible answer can be based on the mathematics of order structures. (Franklin 2014b) 
A partial order (in mathematical terminology) is a binary relation that is reflexive, 
antisymmetric and transitive. A linear or total order is a partial order in which any two elements 
are comparable (for example, “greater than” among whole numbers). The most core or 
paradigmatic quantities are those comparable on at least some total order. One may more 
loosely call any (not necessarily linear) order structure a kind of quantity (in that it permits 
some comparisons on a kind of scale). Thus vectors and complex numbers can be called 
quantities in that all the real-number multiples of a fixed one form a linear order and are thus 
subject to comparison as “more or less”. (Bigelow and Pargetter 1990, section 2.6; Bigelow 
1988, part II(c); Leuenberger and Keller 2009). 
When it comes to considering whether the science of quantity coincides with what we 
understand as mathematics, the inclusion in one direction seems convincing but that in the other 
direction not. 
The theory of quantity as such looks uncannily like what we know as elementary 
mathematics. The science of discrete quantity really is arithmetic as we know it; the science of 
continuous variation is calculus and the theory of the continuum itself in the standard logical 
“construction of the continuum”. What discrete and continuous quantities have in common is 
the kind of thing studied in Euclid’s theory of ratios as well as order theory as such. Those are 
all well-known parts – extensive parts – of mathematics. The theory of how to find out the 
quantities possessed by actual parts of the real world is measurement theory, a kind of applied 
mathematics. There seems nothing to be said about quantity in general that is not mathematics. 
On the other hand, the reverse inclusion is false. Not everything in modern mathematics is 
about quantity. That was explained by Euler when introducing his solution to the Bridges of 
Königsberg problem. Euler proved that it was impossible to walk over all the seven bridges 
once, without walking over at least one of them twice. (Euler 1735; Räz 2018) (Fig 1)  
 
Fig 1: Euler’s Seven Bridges of Königsberg 
 
The result is intuitively about the “arrangement” or pattern of the bridges, rather than about 
anything quantitative like size or number. As Euler says, the result is “concerned only with the 
determination of position and its properties; it does not involve measurements.” The length of 
the bridges and the size of the islands are irrelevant. All that matters is which land masses are 
connected by which bridges. Euler’s result is now regarded as the pioneering effort in the 
topology of networks, and a paradigm example of now vast fields concerned with pure 
connections. Other large areas of modern higher mathematics, such as abstract algebra, are 
equally not reasonably classified as about quantity. 
Nevertheless, any philosophy of mathematics should give an account of why a large part 
of actually existing mathematics does fall under the heading “the science of quantity”. 
 
5. Mill’s “empiricism”, Frege’s objection and Kessler’s theory of 
number 
 
John Stuart Mill’s theory, the best-known naturalist theory of mathematics, is normally 
presented as a long-exploded and easily dismissed view that mathematics consists of inductive 
generalizations from experience. The truth is a little more complex. For present purposes, what 
is of interest is not so much anything about the origins or certainty of mathematical knowledge, 
but Mill’s account of what mathematics (at least arithmetic) is actually about. 
His theory represented mathematics as an inductive science of the quantity of “aggregates”, 
differing from other sciences such as chemistry simply in the generality of its subject matter, 
and learnable by manipulating physical objects. Arithmetic truths are just very general truths 
about quantity, arising from things being parted: 
There are no such things as numbers in the abstract. Ten must mean ten bodies, or ten 
sounds, or ten beatings of the pulse. But though numbers must be numbers of something, 
they may be numbers of any thing … All things possess quantity; consist of parts which 
can be numbered; and in that character possess all the properties which are called 
properties of numbers. (Mill 1862, bk. II ch. vi §2; discussions in Kitcher 1998; Bostock 
2009, ch. 3) 
Frege argued that number could not be a property of things, as Mill thought, because many 
different numbers apply to a given heap, depending on how we choose to count (the Iliad is 
one poem or 24 books or a large number of verses). (Frege 1980, §22, p. 28) However, Mill 
was well aware of that. His actual statement of the nature of number is: 
[Number is] … some property belonging to the agglomeration of things which we call 
by the name; and that property is the characteristic manner in which the agglomeration 
is made up of, and may be separated into, parts … When we call a collection of objects 
two, three, or four, they are not two, three, or four in the abstract, but two, three, or four 
things of some particular kind; pebbles, horses, inches, … (1862, bk. III ch. xxiv §5.) 
That suggests the theory that number is a relation between an “agglomeration” or heap and the 
“kind” or universal that divides it into units. Glenn Kessler develops Mill’s theory in exactly 
that way. A number is a “special sort of relation that holds between aggregates and properties 
that pick out parts of those aggregates.” He writes, in reply to Frege’s objection, 
The question “Does 52 apply to this pack of cards?” lacks a determinate answer not 
because we have applied a number to an external object, but because we have mistaken 
a relation for a simple property … in claiming that a certain aggregate x contains 52 cards 
we are claiming that the numerical relation 52 holds between the aggregate x and the 
property of being a card. (Kessler 1980, developed further in Forrest and Armstrong 
1987; adopted in Franklin 2014a, ch. 3; a more extended Aristotelian reply to Frege in 
Irvine 2010) 
Mill’s theory and its successors, of course, only claim to be an account of whole numbers, not 
of mathematics overall. However, Gillies (2015) extends a loosely Millian account by taking 
advantage of the constructibility of (almost) all mathematics in set theory. If sets can be given 
a naturalistic, Aristotelian explanation, that should in principle account for all of mathematics. 
But some sets like a colony of bees are natural, being bound together by real relations such as 
proximity and functional relationship to the queen. Sets of that kind (though not arbitrary ones) 
play obvious roles in science. Gillies follows Maddy (1990 58-67; connections with natural 
language in Moltmann 2013) in holding that (many) sets are embodied, have causal powers 
and can be perceived; one can look in an egg carton and see that there are three eggs, thus 
perceiving a set of three eggs. (Maddy’s later defection from an Aristotelian point of view was 
the result of issues unconnected with this view of simple sets; an Aristotelian reply in Park 
2018, ch. 10). 
Aristotelian accounts of the nature of sets are available which contrast with the Platonic 
view of them as sui generis abstracta, though they have not found general acceptance. Sets are 
particulars (since an individual set is not repeatable), so they need a different account from 
(repeatable) properties. Armstrong (1991) suggests that a set is the heap (mereological sum) of 
its singleton sets, and that the singleton set of X is the state of affairs of X’s having some unit-
making property. (Other proposals listed in Paseau 2008) In any case, sets on an Aristotelian 
view are not physical objects, but a different category of being, one which can be (but need not 
be) realized in physical objects. 
Millian theories thus have brighter prospects than has normally been supposed in the 
philosophy of numbers. Whether they can give a good account of other mathematical properties 
like ratio and symmetry is as yet less clear. 
6. The science of relations as such 
 
The theory that mathematics is especially about relations has long existed at the level of 
gnomic utterance and half-conscious tendency. It can be defended as a standalone explicit 
philosophy of mathematics. 
Poincaré famously said, “mathematicians do not study objects, but the relations between 
objects; to them it is a matter of indifference if these objects are replaced by others, provided 
that the relations do not change.” (Poincaré 1905, 20; similar in Russell 1903, ch. I §8) 
Relations are not “objects” in the sense of particulars, but repeatables of a certain kind (though 
of course they can, like colors, be objects in the sense of objects of study). Many shifts of 
perspective in the history of mathematics have involved moving to a more relational point of 
view. For example, to see functions not as formulas but rather as relations between domain and 
codomain (satisfying certain conditions) is not simply more abstract, but more purely 
relational. The success of category theory as an overarching perspective on mathematics 
resulted from its disengaging morphisms between objects from anything about the nature of 
the objects. (Mac Lane 1986; discussion in McLarty 2007, section 2) 
The theory that mathematics is simply the study of relations as such is defended by Robert 
Thomas. He suggests graph theory as an ideal context to appreciate the relational view: 
If one models something with a graph … one may be modelling activities by the edges 
of a graph whose vertices just represent the termination of the tasks, as in the critical-
path method, or one may be modelling places by vertices and the routes among them by 
edges, as in the travelling-salesman problem. But places and times are not significantly 
like the vertices, which have no character to be like. And activities and distances are not 
like edges, which are just pairs of vertices. In these and other cases, graphs represent 
naked relations with any quantitative elements as add-ons. (Thomas 2008, 253) 
The defender of the science-of-relations theory of mathematics may be excused from giving an 
account of what relations are. Relations are a basic and familiar category of being (and not, for 
example, sets of ordered pairs). If mathematics really is the science of relations as such, that 
can be taken as bedrock.  
Aristotelians insist too on the reality of relations. “Causality is the mark of being.” We 
perceive mass because of its effect on us; likewise we perceive relations because of their effect 
on us. Indeed, our perceptual systems are set up to be particularly sensitive to relations. For 
example, the ratio of your height to mine is easily perceived if we stand next to each other. It 
is a difficult task for visual perception to extract invariant relations in the world, like shape and 
distance, from the more transient and even more relational play of projections on the retina 
from different perspectives, but the visual system is capable of extracting the invariant distant 
causes of the changing proximal effects. (Walsh and Kulikowski 1998, especially ch. 7 and 14) 
Symmetry perception involves seeing complex relationships. 
The defender of the science-of-relations theory needs to show inclusions both ways: that all 
of mathematics can be seen in terms of relations; and that everything to do with relations in 
general is part of mathematics. The first of these tasks has attracted more attention than the 
second. 
A philosophy of numbers that explains them without remainder in terms of relations – more 
so even than Kessler’s theory described above – is that of Bigelow. His theory of whole 
numbers is that the number n is the relation of n-fold mutual distinctness between objects. Thus 
the fact that A and B are two is just the fact that A is not the same individual as B. (Bigelow 
1988, ch. 6) 
Bigelow admits the reality of relations of proportion between quantities such as lengths but 
highlights instead the more purely relational (rational) ratios, which are a kind of relation 
between relations: the relation double holds between being-a-grandparent and being-a-parent, 
while the ratio 3:2 holds between being-a-great-grandparent and being-a-grandparent. 
(Bigelow 1988, ch. 11-12; Bigelow and Pargetter 1990, §8.3) 
Thomas broadens the story to other areas of mathematics by looking at several incidents 
from the history of mathematics which suggest that all of classical mathematics can be seen as 
the pure study of relations. For example functions are a specific sort of relation, and 
differentiation came to be seen as a relation between functions. Abstract algebra is (or includes) 
the study of operations, a certain kind of ternary relation. (Thomas 2008, 254) 
As to the reverse inclusion, one can ask what the theory of relations in general would look 
like if it were approached on its own terms, free from preconceptions. Would it be recognizably 
mathematics, or part of mathematics? 
First, one would classify relations by their arity. Then for binary relations, one would 
naturally distinguish, in purely logical terms, between equivalence relations and order relations, 
functions and non-functions, and deal with composition of relations. The particular order 
relation characterised by having a start, one successor to every element, and never cycling (as 
described in Peano’s axioms) is sufficient to give rise to arithmetic. Among ternary relations, 
binary operations are particularly important and give rise to algebraic structure … The theory 
of relations as such begins to look like a very substantial part of mathematics. 
Thus chess is mathematics because it is purely relational: chess pieces have no properties 
other than their roles in the game (their shapes being mere reminders of which piece they are). 
Chess is not normally taken to be serious mathematics because of the arbitrary choice of rules 
(and because what makes a good strategy in human chess is relative to an outside contingent 
fact, the intelligence of players). But the existence of a knight’s tour of the chessboard, the 
solvability of newspaper chess puzzles with a given configuration and instruction “black to 
mate in two moves” and the abilities of AlphaZero in playing chess at superhuman levels are 
all pure mathematics. 
7. The science of structure 
 
Once it was agreed that examples like the Königsberg bridges and abstract algebra showed 
that “the science of quantity” was too narrow a definition of mathematics, it became natural to 
look for some other characterization of its subject matter. Higher mathematics came to be seen 
as the study of structure, a view associated with the name of Bourbaki, who classified structures 
into algebraic, topological and order structures. (1950; Corry 1992) 
In the philosophy of mathematics, Benacerraf’s celebrated paper (1965) argued that 
(ordinal) arithmetic was the study of what progressions had in common and concluded (in 
language more Aristotelian than sometimes noticed by later writers) that arithmetic is “the 
science that elaborates the abstract structure that all progressions have in common merely in 
virtue of being progressions”. What is important about the numbers is not their individual 
properties but “the structure which they jointly exhibit”: 
Numbers are not objects at all, because in giving the properties (that is, necessary and 
sufficient) of numbers you merely characterize an abstract structure … the “elements” of 
the structure have no properties other than those relating them to other “elements” of the 
same structure.   (Benacerraf 1965, 70) 
From the Aristotelian realist point of view, that is suggestive and welcome, but two problems 
arise. The first is a tendency among many subsequent authors to interpret “structures” as some 
kind of Platonist entities like sets, as in the most prominent structuralist philosophy of 
mathematics, Shapiro’s Philosophy of Mathematics: Structure and Ontology. (1997; non-
Aristotelian versions of structuralism are surveyed in Hellman 2007). That leads to the usual 
difficulties of Platonism, and obscures possible Aristotelian directions. 
The second problem is the vagueness of meaning of “structure”. The difficulty of defining 
“structure” has been the Achilles heel of structuralist philosophies of mathematics. (Pointed 
out in Colyvan 1998) One suggestion for a definition is:  
A property is purely structural if it can be defined wholly in terms of the concepts same 
and different, and part and whole (along with purely logical concepts). (Franklin 2014a, 
57; another attempt in Korbmacher and Schiemer 2018) 
In short, a purely structural property is one definable in logic and mereology. For example, to 
be symmetrical with the simplest sort of symmetry is to consist of a part and another part which 
are the same in some respect. To say that mathematics is the science of “structure” is then just 
to say that it studies purely structural properties. 
To show that all or much of mathematics is included in the science of structure and vice 
versa, the structuralist proposes to piggyback on the standard results on the constructability of 
most of mathematics in set theory, while reinterpreting sets and membership in terms of part 
and whole. For example, by transposing the standard set-theoretical definition of a topological 
space into mereology, it can be shown how the central notion of topology, that of an open set, 
is expressible solely in terms of parts: a collection of parts of an object can be called the open 
parts provided: 
1. The empty part and the whole object are open 
2. Any sum of open parts is open 
3. Any finite intersection of open parts is open 
 (Franklin 2014a, 61-62; examples from various areas of higher mathematics in Bell 2004) The 
point is to do without Platonic abstract objects such as sets, while being left with the reduction 
of mathematics to purely structural properties. 
The relation of the “science of structure” theory of mathematics to the “science of relations” 
theory is a close one. Arguably they are actually the same theory rather than rivals, as it may 
be a mere matter of human perspective whether a subject matter is regarded as a “whole” or 
“system” with parts, or a disaggregated heap with relations among the constituents. If that is 
so, regarding something as a structured whole and investigating the relations between its parts 
is not really different from investigating the relations among many things. It is thus for mainly 
historical reasons that a perspective on “structure”, coming from algebra and other areas of 
higher mathematics, is not normally counted as the same as the “relations” perspective based 
on the philosophical remarks of Poincaré and Russell. 
That is confirmed by the much studied case of progressions, as in Benacerraf’s paper. 
Whether one chooses to regard the progression as a whole or not does no work in the theory of 
arithmetic, which just proves theorems from Peano’s postulates about all finite numbers (that 
is, constituents of progressions). 
Both the science of relations view and the science of structure view call attention to real-
world cases which contain a great deal of relations and structure, that is, complexity. Several 
semipopular books such as Gleick’s Chaos (1987) and Waldrop’s Complexity Theory (1992) 
promised to describe a new and all-encompassing “science of complexity”. They described 
interdisciplinary work on such topics as evolutionary and self-organizing systems, but the 
results about what different systems had in common were mathematics, typically in dynamical 
systems theory. The “science of complexity” is part of mathematics, but there are simple 
structures as well. 
8. The science of patterns 
 
The idea that patterns in nature especially call for mathematical description is a staple of 
popular expositions of mathematics. Ian Stewart writes: 
We live in a universe of patterns. Every night the stars move in circles across the sky. 
The seasons circle at regular intervals … Tigers and zebras are covered in patterns of 
stripes … Human mind and culture have developed a formal system of thought for 
recognizing, classifying and exploiting patterns. We call it mathematics.  (Stewart 1995, 
1; also Devlin 1994, 3; Steen, 1988) 
As in the case of structure, examples and generalities have been much more prevalent than 
attempts to define precisely what counts as pattern, and to decide whether it differs from 
structure. In Stewart’s examples, repetition is important, and indeed the most paradigmatic 
“patterns”, like stripes and wallpaper patterns, do involve strict repetition. But regularities that 
would normally be called patterns can be less strict than that. Dennett makes use of the 
mathematical theory of compressibility: a series (of dots or numbers) is patterned, as opposed 
to random, if there is some way of describing it more efficient than simply copying it all bit by 
bit. Hence, “a pattern exists in some data – is real – if there is a description of the data that is 
more efficient than the bit map, whether or not anyone can concoct it.” (Dennett 1991, 32-4; 
developed in Ladyman et al. 2007, 226-8) For our purposes, what is important is the 
combination of Aristotelian realism – patterns are an objective feature of nature – with their 
being defined wholly in mathematical terms. 
Resnik in Mathematics as a Science of Patterns defines “pattern” so widely as to apparently 
include any structural property, including ones that are not purely structural, taking “specific 
notes (or sounds) in a musical pattern to be as much a part of the pattern as their arrangement.” 
Mathematics however deals with pure patterns, for which a position in a pattern has “no 
distinguishing features other than those it has in virtue of being the particular position it is in 
the pattern to which it belongs.” Resnik’s account of patterns is officially largely Platonist, but 
is so qualified as to have strong Aristotelian tendencies. He writes:  
Pattern‐congruence is an equivalence relation whose field I take to include both abstract 
mathematical structures and arrangements of more concrete objects … When a pattern 
and an arrangement of so‐called concrete objects such as the pennies are congruent then 
I say that the arrangement instantiates the pattern … The pennies thus instantiate the one‐
to‐ten pattern. (Resnik 1999, 203-4) 
So his “instantiation” is just the ordinary Aristotelian multiple realization of universals such as 
blue: there is something real and repeatable that occurs the same in different instances – 
instantiability in multiple physical instances is just what distinguishes Aristotelianism from 
(standard, full) Platonism. Thus Resnik’s theory is very naturally interpreted as an Aristotelian 
realism. 
Theorists of pattern have not concentrated on the nature of numbers, but Resnik follows 
Benacerraf in taking the system of numbers as the prime example of a pattern. 
9. Comparison of Aristotelian theories 
 
The different Aristotelian theories have arisen in different contexts. They are not rivals in 
the sense in which Platonism, nominalism and Aristotelianism are rivals in that only one can 
be true. If any theory has defects in comparison to others, it is more in failing to cover the 
whole field of mathematics than in giving a false account of the subject-matter which it takes 
as its paradigm. 
Thus as we saw the “science of structure” theory and the “science of relations” theories are 
very close, to the extent of being reasonably seen as rebrandings of each other. “Pattern” and 
“complexity” are naturally seen as aspects of relations or structure: patterns are structures in 
which repetition is prominent, while complexity means a lot of structure, often with the 
suggestion of a range of kinds of parts and/or kinds of relations between them. Theories such 
as Mill’s and Kessler’s restrict themselves largely to an account of the natural numbers, so can 
fit into wider theories in various ways. 
One might hope that an eirenic approach to the various realist perspectives coming from 
different areas would result in a synthesis of them which revealed the one true object of 
mathematics. It is certainly unsatisfying that such a synthesis seems to be currently not 
available. The obstacle lies in the non-purely-relational nature of quantities. The ratio of 1.57 
metres to 0.35 metres is certainly a relation, but a relation of size. That ratio is a relation, and 
is for example the same as the relation between 15.7 grams and 3.5 grams, but it is not purely 
relational in the way symmetry is. It is hard to see what single overarching category could 
include size – surely basic to mathematics – and the wholly relational properties of set theory, 
graph theory and modern higher mathematics. While much of what there is to say about 
quantity comes from its structure as a linear or near-linear order, size is not itself purely 
structural. (Franklin 2014a, 63-66) 
The “science of quantity” theory, based on the paradigm of elementary mathematics, thus 
differs significantly from the “science of relations or structure” theory, based on the paradigm 
of higher mathematics. A true unity between the two seems at present unattainable.  
 
10. Aristotelian realism with a dash of fictionalism 
As mentioned in section 2 above, questions about the subject-matter of mathematics are not 
the same as questions about whether all the nouns in mathematical discourse should be 
interpreted realistically. Language is a flexible instrument for dealing with reality and there is 
no problem with debating, within a realist perspective more generally, whether locutions such 
as “the Australian people”, “the law of gravity” or “the national debt” refer to real entities or 
are merely ways of speaking that are helpful for thinking about other real entities. A fictionalist 
philosophy of all mathematical entities would be incompatible with Aristotelian realism, since 
a realist view of basics like ratio and symmetry were where Aristotelian realism started. But a 
fictionalist view of esoteric entities like complex numbers and higher infinities is quite 
compatible with the thrust of Aristotelian realism. 
Bigelow (1988, chs 13-14) and Franklin (2014a, 231-3) in fact defended realist 
interpretations of the complex numbers, and Franklin took a hyperrealist view across the board, 
arguing that the only fictional entities in mathematics were zero and the empty set (which of 
their nature cannot be instantiated). Someone with down-to-earth Aristotelian tendencies might 
well blanch at that ontological prodigality. It is possible, and natural, to be realist about some 
of the older and more central entities of mathematics but to regard the more esoteric ones as 
fictions. For example, one could, inspired by Kronecker’s remark that “God made the whole 
numbers, all the rest is the work of man” (Weber 1891-2, 19) maintain that, say, whole numbers 
and ratios are natural and perceivable in the physical world, but, say, complex numbers and 
Hilbert spaces are fictions created by humans for some specifiable purpose. 
There is a problem about where to draw the line, since there is no obvious stopping point. 
Nevertheless the pull of fictionalism about at least the higher mathematics is strong. The role 
of human invention in mathematics is well-known “from the inside”. We understand why 
mathematicians think up new concepts for reasons apparently unconnected with any literal 
reality. Different flavors of Aristotelian realism come from choosing different stopping points 
on the road from hyperrealism to out-and-out fictionalism. That illustrates that Aristotelian 
realism is not a totalizing philosophy like Platonism or nominalism. Platonism claims that all 
mathematical entities are of the same nature, namely abstract objects, while nominalism claims 
they do not exist at all (and fictionalism claims they are all fictions). Aristotelian realism is 
different. It is a broad church. It advises looking at mathematical entities on a case by case 
basis. 
 
11. Objections to Aristotelianism 
 
Aristotelian approaches to mathematics face three main objections – objections which apply 
to all Aristotelian theories rather than to any of the particular versions just described. 
The first and best-known, applying just to number theory, is Frege’s argument that numbers 
cannot be properties of real aggregates. It was considered with Aristotelian replies in section 
4. 
The second is that mathematics appears to deal sometimes with structures much too large to 
be instantiated, such as higher infinities, or possibly even huge finite numbers (if the universe 
is finite). (Koo 2016) As Balaguer (2008/2018) puts it, “set theory is committed to the existence 
of infinite sets that are so huge that they simply dwarf garden variety infinite sets, like the set 
of all the natural numbers. There is just no plausible way to interpret this talk of gigantic infinite 
sets as being about physical objects.” 
Aristotelians point out first that this problem is not unique to mathematics. If Newton’s law 
of gravity connects mass, distance and force, it is not normally argued that it is not about 
physical reality just because some masses, distances and forces are too large to be instantiated 
in our world. Newton’s law is about mass in general, and applies equally to describing actual 
masses and to predicting what would happen with masses not actually instantiated. If the law 
predicts something about masses bigger than those instantiated in the universe, that is not 
normally thought to require positing new “objects” with their own semantics. Computational 
chemistry too often deals with the properties of uninstantiated compounds (typically with a 
view to deciding which are worth manufacturing). It is the business of theoretical science (and 
mathematics) to deal with properties in general, and the business of observational science (and 
counting and measurement) to discover which properties are instantiated. The Aristotelian 
slogan is “instantiation is possible, but not necessary”: it is for the world, not theory, to decide 
what properties are instantiated, but theory can study them all. 
Nevertheless, Aristotelians need to provide an account of uninstantiated or unrealized 
properties, such as a possible uninstantiated shade of blue. That is an issue of general 
metaphysics rather than philosophy of mathematics. Franklin (2015) argues for a “semi-
Platonist” Aristotelianism which admits a certain reality to uninstantiated universals, but not 
as Platonist abstract objects. 
It is also possible, as argued in the previous section, for different Aristotelians to take 
different views on whether some of higher mathematics is in fact fictional. One position is that 
even the higher infinities could be realized in wood if the physical universe had enough 
dimensions; another is that all numbers beyond those instantiated in our finite universe are 
fictions – Aristotelianism can accommodate a range of views on how much of mathematics is 
really instantiated (provided that some is). This is an issue independent of which of the 
“schools” above is chosen, since any school may take more or less skeptical views of which of 
its entities become doubtfully instantiable when huge. 
The third objection to Aristotelianism is that (applied) mathematics appears to deal with 
idealizations or mathematical models of the real world, such as perfect circles, rather than the 
messy and imperfect properties of actual matter. Aristotle reports Protagoras as “refuting” 
geometers by pointing out that hoops touch the ground at several points, unlike perfect circles. 
(Aristotle, Metaphysics 997b35-998a4) Aristotelians argue that that is not always the case – 
for example, figure 1 displays the relevant structure of the Königsberg bridges exactly. And 
where it is true, the obscure philosophical notion of idealization can be replaced by the clear 
mathematical one of approximation. Modern mathematics can cope with the shapes of 
imperfect circles, which are as much geometrical shapes as perfect circles and whose areas are 
(provably) close to those of the perfect circles that approximate them. For example, if a real 
hoop has a shape which differs from a perfect circle of radius 1m by no more than 1% (1cm) 
anywhere, then its area is provably within 2.1% of the area of the perfect circle.  (Franklin 
2014a, 222-9) Mathematics directly describes and proves facts about the shapes of physical 
objects. 
 
Aristotelian realism is a viable alternative philosophy of mathematics to Platonism and 
nominalism. It is more in accord with naturalism than Platonism but unlike nominalism admits 
the reality of perceivable mathematical properties like ratio and symmetry. 
----------------------------------------------------------------------- 
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